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The extent of government de¯cits and debt has been one of the most debated
issues in economics in recent years. Whereas budget de¯cits were initially
considered to be a merely macroeconomic phenomenon, starting from the
1980s a new ¯eld in Political Economics developed, casting light on the topic
from both economic and political perspectives. This movement was inspired
in particular by the notion that many industrialised countries had been fac-
ing considerable budget de¯cits following the ¯rst oil crisis in 1973. Whereas
existing economic theory would predict these de¯cits to vanish during more
prosperous times, in most countries they were persistent over the following
decades. As a consequence, debt levels had been increasing steadily over the
same period and besides, the de¯cits and debt levels varied in size among
various countries facing similar economic conditions and shocks.
In order to explain the cross-country di®erences among the OECD-members,
the existing, normative economic theory alone did not su±ce. Therefore,
political variables, such as the ideological characteristics or the degree of
fragmentation of the government, and institutional factors, like certain as-
pects of the process of budget determination, were included as additional
explanatory variables in models that tried to give a positive explanation for
the observed patterns in de¯cits. At the same time, in Europe the process of
integration towards an economic and monetary union took shape, and with
the rati¯cation of the Maastricht Treaty, signed by 15 members of the EU in
1992, the participating governments bound themselves to strict guidelines on
their macroeconomic policy measures. In order to evaluate the appropriate-
ness of the particular measures imposed, an extensive literature developed
investigating their outcomes and consequences. Besides, almost simultane-
ously, in the US the Balanced Budget Rule was introduced, that imposed
similar budgetary requirements and accordingly stimulated a parallel discus-
sion on the e®ectiveness of ¯scal constraints.
The quest for models explaining budget de¯cits from a positive perspective
considerably gathered momentum over the last two decades, and debates
on the issue of aging populations throughout the western world called for a
further increase in attention for the determinants and consequences of persis-
tent de¯cits on the one hand and successful, sustainable ¯scal policies on the
other. The literature on this topic can be categorised in various ways; ¯rstly,
according to the particular variables whose explanatory power is considered,
with main emphasis on politically oriented variables - e.g. political stability,
size of government, fragmentation of government - vs. institutional factors
2- e.g. type of budgetary procedures, negotiation power of unions etc. Sec-
ond, a considerable number of contributions deal with the question whether
political business cycles are present in the series of budget de¯cits. Besides,
various regions have been under consideration, ranging from the EU or a
selection of OECD countries to the developing world. For the former region,
the impacts of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact on
economic and budgetary performance have been analysed.
A natural alternative criterion for categorisation of the literature would be
the employed methodology. However, it is remarkable that, in this respect,
the lions share of existing works follows the same standards, to the extent
that the vast majority of the literature analyses panel data consisting of
pooled, country-speci¯c time series1 and uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
methods to estimate these models. This similarity in estimation methods
enhances the degree of comparability of the results, but at the same time
raises the question whether it is the most appropriate method for drawing
inference on the forces driving the budget de¯cit.
One of the assumptions underlying the use of Ordinary Least Squares meth-
ods is homogeneity of all observations.2 Many authors recognised that this
assumption is rather strict and insensible, and as a way to add °exibility they
therefore allow for heterogeneity in the constant term (i.e. they estimate ¯xed
e®ect models) or model the error terms in greater detail, typically by allow-
ing for serial or contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation. In general, the
increased degree of heterogeneity is justi¯ed by results of the studies, showing
that indeed the various countries and time periods under consideration pos-
sess di®erent intercepts and error term behaviour. However, these approaches
typically still impose homogeneity on the variables that we are most inter-
ested in in our analysis: the parameters of the explanatory variables. From
an intuitive point of view, this assumption seems rather dissatisfactory in the
context of this paper: is the impact of leftist governments in Sweden similar
to those in Italy? Is the persistence of the budget de¯cit equal in Belgium
and Luxembourg? As an extension to the existing attempts to incorporate
heterogeneity in the model, it will be interesting to increase the degree of
°exibility of these parameters and analyse the extent of similarity and vari-
1These datasets are often labeled Time Series Cross-Section (TSCS) data, and are
characterised by their dimensions: observations are collected repeatedly over time and
pooled together for a limited number of countries N, with the time series dimension T
typically being considerably larger than N.
2I.e. The parameter values are assumed to be constant across countries and the esti-
mated error terms to have an identical homogeneous structure over the complete dataset.
3ability in their values across countries. The Random Coe±cient framework
is a particularly gentle method for carrying out such an analysis, because it
allows the modeler to draw inference on population-wide and country-speci¯c
parameters at the same time. Especially when focusing on the EU, experi-
encing a high degree of interaction and interdependence between economies,
this gives us a powerful tool to evaluate to validity of assumptions of homo-
geneity and analyse as an alternative the degree of heterogeneity together in
one model.
This paper will focus on the 15 countries in the EU that signed the Maas-
tricht Treaty, and analyses the similarities and di®erences in the impacts of
various economic and political determinants of budget de¯cits. Using data
ranging over the period 1971-2006, a Random Coe±cient Model will be con-
structed, incorporating various variables that are selected in line with ¯ndings
in the contemporary literature. Using this model, the presence of partisan
or opportunistic behaviour by policymakers will be analysed, as well as the
impacts that the Maastricht Treaty had on the budget de¯cits in the EU-15.
In order to draw inference on the degree of heterogeneity among the coun-
tries, coe±cients are simultaneously estimated on a population-wide level
and as country-speci¯c parameters. In the following section, an investigation
of existing literature will be provided. Subsequently, the model speci¯ca-
tion will be elicited, and the data analysed. Section 5 gives an introduction
and detailed outline of the Bayesian estimation methodology, followed by an
analysis of empirical results in section 6. The ¯nal section concludes our
¯ndings.
2 Literature review
The basic 'equilibrium' model proposed by Barro (1979) and Lucas and
Stokey (1983) argues that in order to minimise distortions tax rates should
be relatively constant over time and therefore spending and revenue shocks
should be smoothed by budget de¯cits and surpluses. However, this norma-
tive economic argumentation of the 'tax-smoothing' model does not explain
why the budget de¯cits that emerged during the oil crises in the 1970s per-
sisted, and neither why countries facing similar economic shocks experienced
very di®erent paths of budget de¯cits. Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 1996)
argue that economic theory alone cannot explain the issue and in an attempt
to ¯nd positive explanations for the path of budget de¯cits, instead of norma-
tive prescriptions, one should therefore address the political and institutional
aspects of the question. Various variables exist that are candidates to be in-
cluded in such a model.
4In a seminal work, Roubini and Sachs (1989) consider the relation between
de¯cits and the structure of the governments and in particular its fragmen-
tation, ¯nding that multiparty coalition governments have a higher tendency
to develop large and persistent de¯cits. Besides, countries where govern-
ments have short tenures tend to have higher de¯cits on average. In a re-
examination of these results, Edin and Ohlsson (1994) reveal the sensitivity
of the former conclusion to the de¯nition and dimension of the variable cap-
turing government fragmentation, claiming that only minority governments
have a particular tendency to develop large de¯cits, and di®erences between
majority governments with di®erent numbers of participating parties are in-
signi¯cant. De Haan and Sturm (1994) found support for neither of the two
hypotheses based on an investigation of the countries in the European Com-
munity in the 1980s, and conclude that there are no signi¯cant di®erences
in explanatory power among single party majority governments, coalition
governments and minority governments. In more recent literature, di®erent
de¯nitions of the degree of fragmentation are considered and e.g. Volkerink
and De Haan (2001) ¯nd that the number of spending ministers has stronger
and more robust explanatory power than the number of parties in the gov-
ernment. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) ¯nd supportive results and show
that the latter variable even turns insigni¯cant.
Parallel to the discussion on political relations and their impact, a large part
of the literature on de¯cits has focused on ¯nding models that explain the
behaviour of policy-makers by considering di®erences in ideological charac-
teristics or by interpreting de¯cits as a strategic mean that can be used when
seeking re-election. In this context, Franzese (2002) gives a comprehensive
overview of existing views, distinguishing between two types of models that
are generally used to explain and interpret the behaviour of politicians. Op-
portunistic models argue that policy is determined by electoral motivations:
Politicians have no preferences of their own, based on a political conviction,
but just follow policies which maximise their probability of winning the next
elections. Political cycles depending on these policies typically show higher
de¯cits in election years or shortly before, as a result of government giv-
ing bonuses to the electorate and trying to gain popularity right before the
elections. In an empirical investigation of this question, Mink and De Haan
(2005) ¯nd that during election years de¯cits tend to be higher, whereas in
the year preceding the elections they are not. As a nuance to this ¯nding,
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) focus on a larger time period and ¯nd that
instead right-wing governments tend to be in favour of ¯scal stabilisation
during election times.
5Partisan models on the other hand emphasise policymakers' ideological mo-
tivations and argue that right- and left-wing parties follow di®erent policies,
at least partially determined by their ideological preferences. Related cy-
cles should show di®erent patterns in de¯cits depending on the ideological
orientation of the government in o±ce. Alesina and Roubini (1997) ¯nd no
signi¯cantly higher de¯cits for left-wing governments as compared to other
governments. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) show that ideology only in-
°uences the budget process via expenditures - transfers in particular -, and
¯nd no signi¯cant evidence that it leads to di®erences in surpluses or de¯cits.
Volkerink and De Haan (2001) use an ideology index and ¯nd similar results.
Mulas-Granados (2003) analyses the in°uence of political variables on the de-
composition of the government budget, and ¯nds that left wing governments
are not directly associated with higher or lower de¯cits, but do manage to
have more successful ¯scal adjustments in the second half of the 1990s.
Next to the division of political power and the behavioural characteristics
of policymakers, a third category in the literature on de¯cits approaches the
issue from an institutional perspective. Since the early 1990s, several in-
stitutional and political changes have limited the freedom of the European
national governments (and US state governments) to pursue a discretionary
budgetary policy. Being subject to strict rules and guidelines imposed by
the rati¯cation of the Maastricht Treaty, the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact and the introduction of the Euro, many countries managed
to escape from the persistent and massive de¯cits that had been common
during the past decades. Nevertheless, the sensibility and appropriateness
of these measures has been subject to a broad debate. Buiter et al. (1993)
and Roubini (1995) examine the relevance of ¯scal constraints and claim that
rigid ¯scal rules deprive the policy maker of an important tool to stabilise out-
put and smooth tax distortions over time. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay
(2005) evaluate the sustainability of public ¯nances in a country set including
the EU, both before and after 'Maastricht'. They ¯nd that the major part of
member states in the EU pursued sustainable ¯scal policies both before and
after the enforcement of the Maastricht-criteria and consequently question
the necessity of the rigid rules of the SGP. In general, the recent macroeco-
nomic literature on ¯scal policy is remarkably rich and especially in relation
to the European integration process, many contributions have brought better
understandings but also larger contradictions concerning the determinants of
public de¯cits.
While a broad scala exists of approaches to ¯nd di®erent types of deter-
6minants for the magnitude of de¯cits, their degree of adaptation towards
a sustainable level or their duration, this diversity does not apply to the
employed methodology. Particularly driven by the type of data available,
the typical approach uses Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) formulations
to estimate pooled models, that assume that parameters and coe±cients are
constant over all countries in the set. This is a rather rigid assumption,
and although many modelers have recognised the need for additional °ex-
ibility in the model, usually this is only implemented in the estimation of
the error term, where heterogeneity may be allowed for or serial or spatial
correlation may be modeled. Even more general, Beck and Katz (1995) show
that the vast majority of contributions in the ¯eld of comparative Political
Economics has adopted pooled OLS estimation as a standard. They show
that especially in TSCS data sets, drawing inference based on the resulting
statistics can lead to a considerable bias towards the conclusion that param-
eters are signi¯cant. As a solution, they suggest the use of Panel Corrected
Standard Errors (PCSE) to account for the particular spatial relations that
are present in political/macroeconomic TSCS data. As a follow-up in the
attempts to model heterogeneity, the Random Coe±cient Framework is a
very suitable approach. Rather then focusing on the error term solely, it
addresses the actual coe±cients in the model as well, and allows the modeler
to combine individual-speci¯c estimations with overall mean ¯ndings, and
consequently enables the individual estimators to borrow strength from each
other.
3 Model Speci¯cation
In our analysis, we model the determinants of the primary budget de¯cit,
DEFi;t in the following speci¯cation:




¯(4+j);iPIj;i;t + ºi;t;i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T: (1)
Equation (1) de¯nes a time series cross-sectional (TSCS) model over coun-
tries i and years t, where DEFi;t is the ¯scal de¯cit-to-GDP ratio, de¯ned
as the ratio of between net lending including interest and the current GDP.
¢UBi;t is the change in the unemployment rate, ¢yi;t is the change in the
GDP growth rate, DRBi;t is the change in real debt-servicing costs, and
PIj;i;t are various political and institutional variables that will be speci¯ed
later. Finally, vi;t denotes the error term.
7DRB is de¯ned as
DRBi;t = ¢(ri;t ¡ pii;t ¡ gi;t)(Debtt¡1=GDPi;t¡1); (2)
where ¢ denotes the ¯rst di®erence operator, r is the long-term nominal
interest rate, ¼ is the in°ation rate, g is the real GDP growth rate, and
Debtt¡1=GDPi;t¡1 is the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio. The set of political data
PI consists of the following variables:
² Ideoi;t represents the ideological complexion of the government. Follow-
ing the methodology established by Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge
(1998) the variable attempts to account for the relative strength of par-
ties in government with reference to the left-right dimension, through
a ¯ve-point scale in which the proportional shares of the left, center
and right oriented parties are transformed into scores (1 to 5) repre-
senting the degree of dominance of either party both in parliament and
government. It takes the value 1 for right-wing governments, 2 for
center-right governments, 3 for a balanced situation, 4 for center-left
governments, and 5 for left-wing governments. The index is ¯rst com-
piled on a monthly basis and then transformed into an annual index as
a weighted average of the monthly values. The index is introduced in
the regressions as a single variable and also, alternatively, in the form of
dummy variables (IDEO1, IDEO2, IDEO3, IDEO4, and IDEO5, where
we take as reference the balanced situation represented by IDEO3).
As main source for the index we use Woldendorp, Keman and Budge
(1998), although we made adaptations according to our own judgement
- based on historical data - and updated the index to cover the entire
period 1970-2006.
² Eleci;t is a dummy variable taking on value 1 in years during which a
country had (one or more) parliamentary elections and 0 otherwise.
² ±M is a temporal dummy variable, capturing the change in the de¯cit
resulting from the institutional developments following the Maastricht
Treaty. It takes the value of 1 starting in 1994 and all years afterwards,
reasoning that the treaty admittedly went into force slightly earlier, on
1 November 1993, but its e®ects on the macro economies are likely to
become present during the ¯rst year following its rati¯cation. Besides,
as of this year the convergence criteria for potential member states ap-
plied.
8To elucidate the estimation framework of our TSCS model, assume that all K
explanatory variables are stored in the NT £K matrix X, and our dependent
variable in the NT £ 1 vector y. The most common approach to estimate
the relation between the dependent and explanatory variables is by assuming
that the parameters are fully pooled over all countries:
yi;t = Xi;t¯ + vi;t;i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T (3)
This corresponds to an interpretation of the variables ¯j;i;j = 1;:::;K in
equation 1 to be constant over the countries i. As an addition, in the fully
pooled model, one assumes "i;t » N(0;¾2). The assumptions that all pa-
rameters ¯j are identical across countries, and the errors homoscedastic, are
rather strong. Therefore, as a way of increasing the degree of °exibility, the
modeler often allows for some country-speci¯c components in his model, typ-
ically by allowing the constant to vary (i.e. formulate a ¯xed-e®ects model).
Besides, the variance of the residuals is often allowed to vary over countries
or time, and speci¯c error term structures are assumed, in order to model
its development over time, or its dependencies between countries.3 Usually
all these models can be estimated using (an adaptation of) OLS methods.
However, even after incorporating the adaptations to the fully pooled model
described above, the assumptions underlying the model remain rather strict,
and impose that the e®ects of e.g. political variables like ideology are identi-
cal across countries. Loosening this assumption, one can formulate a model
of the form
yi;t = Xi;t¯i + vi;t;i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T: (4)
Now, we estimate country speci¯c parameters ¯i, but the modeler can still
decide whether to allow for interdependencies between countries or not. As-
suming that there exist none is equivalent to estimating country-speci¯c OLS
regressions. Although this would allow for considerably more °exibility, this
advantage comes at the expense of estimation accuracy, since the number of
observations per regression will be reduced by a factor N. Between the two
options of full pooling vs. not allowing for relations between countries, there
exists a trade-o® of °exibility vs. accuracy in the estimation.
This trade-o® can be circumvented by employing another methodology:
even when estimating country-speci¯c parameters like in equation 4, one can
allow these parameters to be related. A gentle approach in our attempt to
model cross-section dependence is the formulation of a Random Coe±cient
3Well known examples that are particularly popular in Political Economics are Panel
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE, c.f. Beck and Katz, 1995), or robust covariance esti-
mation (c.f. Wooldridge, 2002)
9Model (RCM), as proposed by Swamy(1970). In equation 4, one now assumes
¯i = ¯ + ®i, such that:
yi;t = Xi;t¯ + Xi;t®i + vi;t;i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T: (5)
This formulation brings several advantages. In the ¯rst place, it allows for
country-speci¯c parameters, while at the same time taking advantage of the
fact that there is information available on several units. As will be shown
later, the degree of similarity between countries, as measured by covariances
between the country speci¯c parameters, will determine the relative impacts
of ¯ and the country-speci¯c deviation ®i on the actual parameter ¯i. Second,
the size of these two components will reveal a great deal of information on
the comparability of the political forces playing in di®erent countries and,
when modeled over time, can also be used to reveal paths of convergence.
Finally, one will be able to test the hypothesis H0 : ®i = 0;8i, versus the
alternative that indeed the parameters di®er per country.
4 Economic and Political Data: Stylised facts
Columns 2-5 of table (1) show the average values of the public balance per
country, where the sample period is divided in decades and besides columns
6 and 7 present a pre- and post-Maastricht era. Note that in this table, the
budget balance as di®erence between revenues and expenditures is presented,
with a positive value corresponding to a budget surplus, whereas our depen-
dent variable in the regression analyses will be the budget de¯cit. The ¯gures
in table 1 exhibit the notion that almost all countries faced considerable and
persistent budget de¯cits during the ¯rst two decades under consideration.
During the 1970s and the 1980s, only Luxembourg and the UK were able
to improve their average between the decades; Luxembourg even managed
to have budget surpluses in 17 years out of the ¯rst 20 years under consider-
ation in our sample, while the UK still faced de¯cits in 17 years over the two
¯rst decades, but managed to cut back their de¯cits in the six consecutive
years after 1984, and switch to a surplus at the end of that period. Belgium
and Italy faced the highest and most persistent de¯cits, having values well
over ¯ve percent in at least 19 consecutive years after 1974. Ireland also ex-
perienced de¯cits in all years, with slightly lower levels on average, whereas
Greece did particularly badly during the 1980s, with values exceeding the
10 percent in the second half. The Scandinavian countries were an excep-
tion concerning their budgetary policies, since they managed to control their
de¯cits after the deterioration in the second half of the 1970s, and they were
able to present sharp improvements after 1982, leading to surpluses by the
10time of 1986. Whereas Sweden and Denmark did experience de¯cits of up
to seven percent in the period in between, Finland even outperformed them
by only having surpluses in the ¯rst two decades. The remaining European
countries did not manage to pursue this anti-cyclical policy with de¯cits as
smoothing instrument and faced persistent de¯cits after 1974. Spain and
the Netherlands faced deterioration after 1973, reaching de¯cit levels well
over six percent in the early 1980s, and were stuck to values that were just
slightly smaller afterwards. Austria experienced a comparable development,
although its peak was smaller, just over four percent, whereas Portugal went
through worse times and faced de¯cits ranging between four and 9,4 percent
after 1974. Finally, Germany and France succeeded to keep their de¯cits un-
der three percent in most years, although Germany did not experience any
years with budget surpluses between 1974 and 1988, and France experienced
just two years with very small surpluses over the period from 1974 until today.
<<< Insert table (1) about here >>>
This latter observation makes France rather exceptional: whereas all coun-
tries started to pursue policies of ¯scal consolidation to improve their bud-
getary situations, particularly after 1993, the year in which the Maastricht
Treaty was rati¯ed, this led most of them to a state of budget surpluses,
except for France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The countries that did manage
to switch their de¯cits into surpluses experienced a peak in their budgetary
situation in 2000 or 2001, and saw a decrease following the economic deteri-
oration in the early 2000s.
As one of the considered determinants, this paper will focus on the cor-
relation between the extent of budget de¯cits and the ideological convictions
represented in the government. Table (2) presents an overview of the pro-
portion of time spent in every ideological category, where category 1 corre-
sponds to a right-wing government, and category 5 to a left wing-government,
as explained in the previous section. Luxembourg, outperforming all other
countries by almost solely experiencing surpluses rather than de¯cits, had
no left wing or center-left governments, but spent most of the years under
consideration having neutral governments. This also holds for Finland, the
other country that spent most of the time during last decades in a situa-
tion of budgetary surplus. It did not have any government that was either
purely left-, or solely right-wing, and spent more than 27 years with neutral
governments. However, the suggestion that apparently countries that spent
the biggest fraction of our sample period under neutral governments can be
associated with prosperous ¯scal policies, is contradicted by the notion that
also Belgium ¯ts in this category.
11<<< Insert tables (2) and (3) about here >>>
Table (3) shows the number of elections per country per decade. This vari-
able will be used to draw inference on the presence of opportunistic behaviour
by policy makers, and at the same time provides a proxy of the stability in
the countries. However, we should note here that a low or moderate number
of elections does not imply stability in terms of the durations of the govern-
ment, since in our sample many regime changes occurred without elections
taking place.
5 Estimation Methodology: a Bayesian Framework
Although the RCM described in equation 5 is structurally di®erent from the
more homogeneous panel data models that are most commonly used in the
¯eld of Political Economics, it can still be estimated using familiar OLS es-
timators. In particular, the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator of
¯ is its Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (c.f. Hsiao, 2003). However, given
the increase in the number of estimated parameters, compared to a pooled
model, the use of OLS methods comes with certain °aws. First, as shown by
Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (1999), the GLS estimator is considerably
biased, particularly when the sample size is small. Second, due to the con-
struction of the estimators, it provides us only with statistics on the mean
over all countries, and the variability of this parameter. The information on
country-speci¯c estimates is limited to a combination of those two, but does
not provide the opportunity to draw inference on particular estimates at the
country-level and their variability. Given these shortcomings, the alterna-
tive estimation of the model in a Bayesian framework has some attractive
advantages.
Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (1999) have shown that Bayesian esti-
mators have considerably smaller biases than OLS estimators when modeling
a dynamic RCM. In part this is because Bayesian methods allow the mod-
eler to use simulation methods, that reduce the burden coming from the
limited amount of data that is available per country. Although in any case,
the mean ¯ is calculated over all countries, determination of the (variance)
terms related to the country-speci¯c parts of the coe±cients ®i is based on
just T observations. Repeated simulations, like in Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods, provide a solution for this loss in accuracy, which
becomes especially eminent when modeling shorter time periods.
The second advantage of Bayesian methods is that they allow for hierar-
chical estimation: according to whether they apply to all countries or to one
12country in particular, parameters can be simulated in di®erent stages, such
that e.g. the country-speci¯c coe±cients depend in part on the population-
wide estimates. This point will be more pronounced in the next section, after
the estimation methodology has been elicited.
A third advantage that comes together with the hierarchical structure of
our estimations, is the possibility of increasing the number of parameters in
our model, without posing additional demands on the available data; since
in Bayesian methods, every coe±cient estimate is de¯ned by a probability
distribution, rather than by a point estimate, the level, variability and dis-
persion of every coe±cient (also the ones describing variance themselves) can
be expressed and easily presented.
Finally, Bayesian methods provide elegant extensions to produce fore-
casts. Since estimation of a Bayesian model yields parameter distributions
as outcome rather than point estimates, the parameter uncertainty and the
degree of variability involved in its estimation are directly represented by
the precision (or scale) of the relevant density function. Consequently, fore-
casts based on these parameter estimates directly incorporate the degree of
parameter uncertainty and similarly acquire the form of a density function,
with a shape that directly re°ects its accuracy. This is in contrast with fore-
casts based on point estimates from traditional sampling methods, that do
not directly incorporate the parameter uncertainty. Especially in the current
context of budget de¯cits, the easily accessible option to provide forecasts
will be interesting to explore, in order to evaluate the e®ect of potential
changes in the political climate on the budgetary situation of the countries
under consideration.
In order to enhance a better understanding of our later results, the next
subsection will expose the Bayesian methodology employed in this paper,
starting from a short introduction into Bayesian concepts in general. For a
more detailed introduction into Bayesian econometrics, we refer the reader
to textbooks such as Koop (2003), providing a very intuitive explanation, or
Lancaster (2004).
5.1 A Bayesian set-up
Bayesian econometrics ¯nds its roots in a common rule from probability
theory, that plays such a central role in its methodology that its name is






13where p(¢j¢) denotes a conditional density and p(¢) a marginal density. Now,
interpretation of µ to be the parameters of our model and z to be the data set
the analysis is based on, yields the left hand side of expression (6) to represent
the density of our parameters, conditional on the data. This is exactly the
variable that Bayesian modelers are interested in, and in fact intuitively
similar to the outcome of OLS methods: based on data one draws inference
on particular parameters. At the same time, the expression p(µjz) describes
an essential di®erence between Bayesian econometrics on the one hand and
more traditional frequentist methods on the other: Bayesian analyses have
densities as outcome, rather than point estimates.
From the right hand side of expression (6), one can conclude that the
density of interest is de¯ned by three terms:
² p(zjµ), which is the likelihood function of the parameters µ;
² p(µ), which is the marginal probability of the parameters;
² p(z), which is the (marginal) likelihood function of the data under
consideration.
This latter term does not involve the parameters of interest and therefore
normalisation with respect to p(z) has no e®ect on the ¯ndings for p(µjz),
such that:
p(µjz) / p(zjµ)p(µ): (7)
In this expression of proportionality, the last term p(µ) is what Bayesians
typically call a prior density: it represents the beliefs of the modeler about
the parameters prior to analysing the data. Similarly, the conditional density
p(µjz) obtained after analysing the data, is called posterior. Finally, the
term p(zjµ) is the likelihood function that is familiar from other estimation
techniques like Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
5.1.1 Basic Assumptions
Expression (7) reveals that the density of ultimate interest can, up to a pro-
portionality factor, be obtained by calculating the product of the likelihood
of the parameters and their prior. Therefore, the crucial assumptions under-
lying the analysis refer to these two terms. With respect to the ¯rst one,
Bayesians start from a basic assumption that is most common in frequentist
methods as well4: "m » N(0;¾2), and "m1 and "m2 are independent of each
4Results in this section are based on the following notation of a straightforward econo-
metric model: ym = Xm¯ + "m, m = 1 : M. Although this speci¯cation di®ers from the
RCM exposed earlier, for the sake of transparency it is more convenient to present the
model in a simpli¯ed version here, and add one dimension in the next subsection.
14other for m1 6= m2.5 Using standard results from probability theory, this
implies that also our dependent variable y has a likelihood with a normal
kernel.
Given the similarity between Bayesian methods and frequentist econo-
metrics regarding the form of the likelihood function, the most controversial
part of Bayesian methods is the prior density in the right hand side of expres-
sion (7). The choice for a particular functional form for this prior can have
considerable impacts on the outcome of the analysis, the posterior density.
However, as will be articulated later, particular distributional de¯nitions can
be chosen for the prior such that it does not in°uence the shape of the pos-
terior distribution of the parameters: so-called uninformative priors.
Apart from its implications, the form of the chosen prior is of vital im-
portance for the tractability of the results: multiplication of two probability
density functions does by no means necessarily lead to a gentle posterior
distribution. However, certain choices exist such that the resulting posterior
becomes a neatly tractable function. In particular, selection of a natural
conjugate prior, when combined with the Normal likelihood function, leads
to a posterior with a similar kernel, i.e. to a posterior from the same dis-
tributional class. At this point, it is important to split the parameter set
µ that has been considered so far, and specify two parts containing the ele-
ments ¯ and ¾¡2, respectively. The latter term can be interpreted to be the
precision of the error term and will be denoted h throughout the rest of this
introductory section. Then, the proportionality in expression (7) reads:
p(¯;hjz) / p(zj¯;h)p(¯;h) = p(zj¯;h)p(¯jh)p(h); (8)
using standard rules of probability. Referring to Koop (2003) for further
details and references, we note here that, particularly motivated by the ana-
lytical tractability of the results, it is rather common to make the distinction
between the model's coe±cients ¯ and the precision of the error term. Be-
sides, partitioning the parameter set is a convenient way to address speci¯c
variables of interest, and enables the modeler to specify particular distribu-
tional assumptions suited for the parameter he wants to focus on. In this
context, it is a common choice to assume that the prior densities of ¯ and
h are independent of one another, such that p(¯jh) = p(¯) in expression (8)
and next de¯ne
¯ » N(¯;V ) and h » G(s¡2;v): (9)
Here, the bars underlining the parameters indicate that it concerns prior
hyperparameters, to be de¯ned by the modeler. Interestingly, the parameters
5These assumptions can be adapted to allow for e.g. heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation, without having essential consequences for the nature of the results.
15¯, s¡2 and v are the prior equivalents of the OLS estimators for ¯, standard
errors and the degrees of freedom, respectively, and V represents the prior
expectation of the variance of ¯.
Based on these choices regarding the type of prior, and multiplying them
with the normal likelihood of the dependent variable, the resulting joined pos-
terior density of the parameters ¯ and h, p(¯;hjz), takes a non-convenient
form. Therefore it will prove very convenient to express these posterior den-
sities in a conditional form6: p(¯jh;y) and p(hj¯;y). As a consequence, all
members of the other subclass(es) of the parameter set can be treated as
constants, and the conditional densities prove to have very gentle forms:
p(¯jh;y) » N(¢) and p(hj¯;y) » G(¢). The relevant location and scale pa-
rameters of these distributions will be described in the next subsection, after
the current Bayesian model is adapted to the context of RCM.
5.1.2 Simulations
Conditioning the marginal densities of the parameters in the model on all
other parameters in the model implies that posterior results will be interde-
pendent. Since, in general, the posterior distributions cannot (all) be derived
analytically, the typical Bayesian estimation approach uses simulation meth-
ods, for which the conditional posterior expressions provide very neat input
arguments. They allow for taking subsequent draws from distributions that
are more easily tractable, ¯rst for ¯ from the normal distribution depending
on h, and next for h from the Gamma-distribution conditional on the drawn
value for ¯. Running this short algorithm repeatedly, one ends up with a
path of draws for both variables, with all pairs depending on the latest draw
of the other variable. This procedure is called Gibbs sampling. When increas-
ing the number of simulations, convergence theorems imply that one obtains
an approximation of the marginal densities p(¯jy) and p(hjy), on which the
interest of the exercise centers. The number of draws per iteration of the
simulation can be increased, by dividing the parameter space into more than
two subsets.7 Often, the estimation framework is rather complicated - e.g.
due to inclusion of additional variables, or particular assumptions on their
underlying structures, as is the case in RCM - leading to non-tractable joint
posteriors, or the chosen prior does not yield appealing posterior functional
forms. In those cases, having the opportunity of drawing simulations from
6Note that, whereas the priors for ¯ and h are assumed to be independent, their
posteriors are not, due to the multiplication by the likelihood of z, p(zj¯;h) in which both
terms are included.
7As an example, when ¯ is a vector, one can de¯ne posteriors for every element condi-
tional on all other elements in ¯ and h
16more tractable conditional posteriors is a very useful tool.
An additional advantage of employing a Bayesian estimation framework
refers to the possibility to provide detailed posterior results on prediction
of the dependent variable. The aim of such an exercise is to derive, from
a hypothetical or forecasted data set X¤, a resulting set of values for the
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Since the posterior of ¯ is in fact a probability density function (and the
posterior of ² too), consequently the following result for y¤ will also be a














Since the simulation methods described in the previous paragraph provided
estimates for the posterior p(¯;hjz) in the right hand side of expression (10),
the posterior predictive density of y¤ can directly be derived by using the
draws for the posterior parameters in every iteration of the simulation and
multiply them by p(y¤jz;X¤;¯;h), as a numerical approximation of the in-
tegrals in expression (11).
5.2 Bayesian formulation of a RCM
The simulation methods described above are one of the advantages of apply-
ing a Bayesian methodology. Another advantage described is the opportunity
to incorporate hierarchical structures in the model. This is particularly sen-
sible in the Random Coe±cient Model under consideration in this paper,
because we want to estimate country-speci¯c parameters, but at the same
time model an underlying pattern that applies to all countries. Returning to
the formulation in equation (4), we assume that the country-speci¯c param-
eters are normally distributed with:
¯i » N(¹¯;V¯): (12)
Here, di®erent from the structure exposed in expression (9), ¹¯ and V¯ are not
prior hyperparameters, but random variables themselves that have particular
distributions. In this way, a second hierarchical stage is created, that links
the draws for country-speci¯c parameters and allows the country-speci¯c








Again, the parameters with a lower bar are hyperparameters to be de¯ned
by the modeler. W(¢) denotes the Wishart distribution8. In the next section
we will focus on the impacts that particular choices will have. Finally, for





Note that in this de¯nition, we allow for heteroscedasticity and model country-
speci¯c (inverted) variances. However, a priori, for all countries these are
assumed to be drawn from the same distribution.
The appealing consequence of including a second stage is that for all param-
eters with a prior density (as opposed to a prior constant value), similarly
a posterior density can be found. That gives us the opportunity to eval-
uate in one model the distributions of the country-speci¯c parameters and
the shape of their mean. Under the current choices of prior distributions,
these posteriors have gentle forms, when presented conditionally. Following
the notation in Koop (2003) and indicating parameters of posterior densities





N ;¹¯;V¯ » N(¯i;V i); (16)
with















It is an instructive and fruitful exercise to observe the similarities between
these Bayesian estimators and OLS statistics. The country-speci¯c coe±-
cients are drawn from a normal distribution with a mean ¯i that depends on
two types of terms. The ¯rst one are ¯xed inputs: data and the conditional
parameters, as can be found in the ¯rst term between parentheses in the
expressions for V i and ¯i. The ratio of these two '¯xed' data terms is exactly
the OLS estimator of the country-speci¯c coe±cients: b ¯i = (X0
iXi)¡1(X0
iyi).
Next to that, both the mean and variance of the distribution of ¯i contain an-
other type of terms, that are not country-speci¯c but rather population-wide.
8Here, the Wishart distribution is parameterized such that E[V
¡1
¯ ] = º¯V
¡1
¯
18Their values are obtained by draws from their particular distributions, that
are obtained as a consequence of the prior assumptions we made. Turning to
this second stage of the model, the relevant conditional posteriors densities
for the hierarchical parameters are:
¹¯jy;¯;h;V¯ » N(¹¯;§¯); (17)
V
¡1

























(¯i ¡ ¹¯)(¯i ¡ ¹¯)
0 + º¯V ¯:
Now the conditional distributions of the hierarchical components have been
speci¯ed, one can further interpret the terms underlying expression (16). The
posterior mean ¯i was seen to be partially dependent on data. The other
determining factor is the overall mean ¹¯, that is drawn from a distribution
with a posterior mean that also depends on two terms: the estimated mean
e ¯ and the prior mean ¹
¯. Similar to the interpretation of the variables in the
¯rst stage, the actual posterior mean ¹¯ is a weighted average of these two





respectively. Similarly, in the construction of the posterior mean ¯i of ¯i, the
two founding elements are weighted according to their (inverted) variance:
the actual variation in the data ¾
¡2
i X0
iXi and the simulated variance of ¹¯,
V¯.




i jy;¯;¹¯;V¯ » G(si
¡2;º); (19)
with
º = T + º
si
2 =
(yi ¡ Xi¯i)0(yi ¡ Xi¯i) + ºs2
º
:
19Although the introduction of hierarchical priors makes the overall model
somewhat more di®use, it is exactly this possibility to increase the number
of parameters that makes it a powerful tool: since all results can be obtained
by simulation methods, accuracy of the estimation is primarily dependent on
the number of iterations, rather than the number of observations in the data
set.
5.3 Prior Elicitation
For estimation of the Random Coe±cient described in the previous section,
we construct a model with hierarchical priors. The ¯rst step after formulating
distributional assumptions on the priors, and deriving the resulting posterior
densities as in the previous section, is to specify the particular values for the
prior hyperparameter set (¹
¯;§¯;º¯;V ¯;º;s2). As pointed out before, this
is a rather controversial aspect of Bayesian methods. However, by choosing
uninformative priors, the e®ect of the particular choices we make can be
smoothed out, such that in the analyses, the terms depending on actual data
dominate the results.
In order to see what values would qualify for this purpose, a short look
at the equations concerning the hierarchical parameters su±ces: ¹
¯ and §¯
represent the prior mean and variance respectively. Choosing them small
and large, respectively, minimises their e®ect on the posterior mean ¹¯ and
variance §¯. Therefore, we choose ¹
¯ = 0 and §
¡1
¯ = 0:01 £ IK.9
Regarding the variance of the overall mean, º¯ is the prior sample size,
referring to the country dimension. Since the actual number of countries
under consideration is 15, a (very) small prior will assign maximum weight
to the terms depending on data. Analogously, a large value for the prior
variance V ¯ of the country-speci¯c parameter draws from their mean will be
uninformative. Speci¯cally, we take º¯ = 1 and V ¯ = 10 £ IK.
Finally, concerning the error precision, we select low degrees of freedom
º = 1 and large prior variance s2 = 25.
6 Empirical Results
Using the conditional densities derived in the previous section, a Gibbs sam-
pling algorithm can conveniently be applied to obtain posterior estimations
of the several parameter sets in our model. Main interest here centers on
the resulting approximations of the marginal posterior distributions, that
are obtained using the conditional densities from expressions (16)-(19).
9Here, IK denotes the (K £ K) identity matrix.
20<<< Insert table (4) about here >>>
Columns 1-4 of table (4) present the summary statistics for the population-
wide mean (¹¯)(K£1) of the distribution from which the country-speci¯c pa-
rameters will be drawn in the next hierarchical stage. The autoregressive
persistence parameter has a mean estimated value of 0:835 and its 95% con-
¯dence interval is located above 0:75, but considerably below the unit root
value 1. Note here that in a Bayesian setting, inference is drawn based on
the estimated density of a parameter, rather than a point estimate, and
correspondingly a con¯dence interval is presented as the counterpart of a
signi¯cance level. Therefore, the familiar t-test from frequentist methods on
the signi¯cance of a parameter with level ® ¯nds its Bayesian equivalent in
an evaluation of the location of the corresponding ® con¯dence interval: if it
is completely located in either the negative or the positive domain we reject
the null hypothesis H0 : ¯i;j = 0.
Following this reasoning, table (4) shows that, in line with economic intu-
ition, an increase of unemployment is strongly associated with an increase of
the de¯cit, mainly via an increase in public expenditures. Similarly, economic
acceleration brings along an increase in tax revenues that yields a decrease
in the de¯cit. Both variables, capturing developments in the budget cycle,
exhibit strong explanatory power, revealed by con¯dence intervals that are
located and scaled well away from zero. On the other hand, the density mass
of the posterior for the change in debt servicing costs is dispersed around
zero. Although the mean e®ect is positive, in accordance with the argumen-
tation that increasing costs will put the governmental budget under pressure,
its magnitude cannot be distinguished from zero.
The degree of partisanship and the presence of political business cycles
is captured by the two variables Ideoi;t and Eleci;t, respectively. The impact
of ideology on the public de¯cit is small and widely dispersed around zero.
On the other hand, results for the dummy variable on elections con¯rm the
hypothesis that policymakers behave opportunistically rather than accord-
ing to their partisanship and strongly reveal that de¯cits tend to be higher
during election years. Finally, the mean of the posterior distribution for the
dummy capturing the Maastricht e®ect is in line with the notion that the
macroeconomic and ¯scal restrictions that were imposed brought a general
improvement in the budgetary situation for most participants. Although
the con¯dence interval for the Maastricht-dummy includes the value zero,
the probability mass of its posterior distribution is heavily located in the
negative domain.
Finally, the ¯fth column of table (4) provides an estimate of the variation
21of the country-speci¯c estimates from their mean. This parameter in fact
relates to the second hierarchical stage, where the matrix V¯ as used after
expression (16) assigns a weight to the population-wide mean, depending on
the sum of the squared deviations of the country-speci¯c parameters from this
mean. The statistic presented in column 5 is this variance, scaled down by the
number of countries N, to make it an interpretable variable. It is presented
together with this ¯rst-stage posterior results since it provides a justi¯cation
for our e®orts to model heterogeneity between the countries' parameters,
and its value should be compared to the mean from which it deviates. From
the reported values, we can conclude that the persistence of the de¯cit and
the e®ects of its economic determinants are similar among the countries in
our set. Only the parameter on a change in unemployment shows notable
dispersion from its mean, which can be attributed to di®erences in the social
security systems in countries and the corresponding weight of unemployment
transfers in the total expenditures by the government. Besides, structural
di®erences in the volatility of unemployment cause the magnitude of its e®ect
to be varying over the countries.
The parameters on political variables show a higher degree of variability
among the countries. Especially the parameters on the e®ects of elections
and the impact of the Maastricht e®ect appear, at the country-level, to have
a high deviation from the population-wide mean. The index on ideology,
having little impact on the de¯cit on average, shows a notable dispersion
when compared to its mean and the precision of its con¯dence interval, sug-
gesting that for particular countries the variable may possess explanatory
power. Following these notions, the next subsection will present the sum-
mary statistics for the country-speci¯c parameters.
<<< Insert table (5) about here >>>
First, table (5) reports the posteriors estimates for the error precision hi.
Since this variable is de¯ned as the inverse variance of the error term, a high
value indicates high error precision and is an indicator of the goodness of ¯t
of the model at the country level. Although the reported values are not very
informative themselves, they do enable us to compare the heteroscedastic
model to a model with a ¯xed error precision h. Doing this, we can observe
that the average of the country-speci¯c precisions reported in table (5) is
considerably higher than the overall precision obtained when ¯xing it over
all countries. 10
10These latter results are not included in this paper, but are available from the authors
upon request.
226.1 Country-speci¯c e®ects
Table (6) reports summary statistics on the posterior results for the country-
speci¯c persistence parameters. In accordance with the notion from ta-
ble (4) that there is little dispersion around its mean, di®erences between
the country-speci¯c values are small, and their means are all in the range
[0:76¡0:88]. Consideration of the con¯dence intervals reveals that the point
1, the unit root value, is included in the 95% con¯dence interval for Spain,
and just slightly excluded for Denmark and Finland, having similarly high
mean parameters, and Luxembourg, having a °atter distribution. However,
the presence of unit roots in our regressions would require major adaptations
to the model speci¯cation, and from a theoretical perspective, the impli-
cations of non-stationary budget de¯cits would be unrealistic. Besides, it
is beyond the scope of this paper to contribute to the ongoing debate in
the literature regarding what are the most proper methods to analyse non-
stationary processes in a panel data framework. Therefore, we su±ce with
the observation that for all countries, 95% of the probability mass is located
below 0:98, such that the null hypothesis H0 : ¯i = 1 can be rejected versus
its alternative H1 : ¯i < 1.
<<< Insert table (6) about here >>>
6.1.1 Partisanship
Table (7) reports posterior results on the variable capturing the impact of the
ideological conviction of the government on the budget de¯cit. This variable
allows us to draw inference on the extent to which policymakers show parti-
san behaviour. Since the partisan model focuses on the impact of ideology,
it only provides guidance on the degree of explanatory power of the ideology
variable; even when the partisan model indeed applies to our dataset, this
does not tell much about the direction of this impact in our model that ex-
plains de¯cits. Although traditionally left-wing parties are associated with
big governments (in terms of the share of their budget in a country's GDP),
and right wing rulers with smaller governments, this applies to both the
level of expenditures (including e.g. social security, subsidies) and to rev-
enues (taxes). At the same time, leftist governments can be expected to
be enhancing a Keynesian anti-cyclical policy that, when properly pursued,
ensures that the surpluses created during prosperous times will cancel out
the de¯cits built on during worse times. Therefore, in the long run these
arguments do not provide a univocal rationale on the expected sign of the
23ideology variable.
<<< Insert table (7) about here >>>
In line with the lack of more profound theoretical expectations on the direc-
tion of a partisan e®ect, results presented in the empirical literature suggest
that government ideology is not a signi¯cant determinant of budget de¯cits.
Our earlier ¯ndings in table (4) and results in the ¯rst column of table (7)
con¯rm this notion: the posterior means of the estimates °uctuate around
zero, and the country-level their absolute value is mostly smaller than 0:05.
Besides, the last column of the table shows that for all countries, the con¯-
dence interval includes the point 0. However, for Sweden in particular, and
for France to a lesser extent, one can observe that the posterior distribu-
tion of the parameter on the ideological index is strongly shifted to one side.
Although the directions are opposite, this notion does provide a weak indi-
cation that in both countries the political conviction of the government can
be linked to budgetary outcomes.
6.1.2 Opportunistic Models and Political Business Cycles
As an alternative for the hypothesis that policymakers act according to
their ideological conviction when setting the budget, the opportunistic model
states that governments tend to use the budget de¯cit as an instrument to
please their electorate. Accordingly, on the eve of elections governments are
expected to loosen their ¯scal policy and increase the level of expenditures
or allow a decrease in the tax revenues, in order to increase their chances
for reelection accordingly, both resulting in an increase of the budget de¯cit.
Indeed, the population mean of the election dummy-variable, as reported in
table (4), reveals a strong positive link between elections and higher de¯cits.
At the same time, the last column shows that there is a moderate degree
of dispersion of the country-speci¯c variables from their overall means. In
order to evaluate the di®erences between particular countries, the parameter
on the election dummy is presented at the country level in table (8).
<<< Insert table (8) about here >>>
These results show that for 10 countries, the null hypothesis that there is
no opportunistic e®ect can be rejected. For all countries except Belgium
and Italy, more than 95% of the probability mass is located in the posi-
tive domain, which allows rejection of the same null hypothesis based on a
24one-sided test.11 The size of the opportunistic e®ect varies over countries.
Interestingly, in Belgium and Italy, both among the countries with the high-
est average level of de¯cits, the positive e®ect of elections on the de¯cit is
the smallest, with a mean parameter below 0.5. An intuitive explanation
for this observation could be that the lack of budgetary strictness that other
countries experienced particularly during election periods, characterised the
policy of Belgium and Italy in general during large parts of the sample pe-
riod. On the other hand, in Finland, having a great budgetary discipline with
an average surplus of over 2:4%, the de¯cit shows the strongest response to
elections, with an increase of over 0:85%.
6.1.3 The Maastricht e®ect
A ¯rst analysis of the time series of budget de¯cits showed that the Euro-
pean countries started to pursue policies of ¯scal consolidation, or at least
thoroughly improved their budgetary situation in the early 1990s. These
developments took place in a period during which countries were subject
to stricter measures and budget rules that were introduced in the Maas-
tricht Treaty and would later become even more rigid; ¯rst in the Stability
and Growth Pact and later upon entrance to the European Monetary Union.
Since the Maastricht Treaty was the ¯rst agreement in the integration process
that actually put constraints on the budgetary policies of the participating
countries, a temporal dummy is included in the model that covers the change
in the de¯cit resulting from enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty: Starting
in 1994, and all years afterwards, it acquires the value of 1.12 Note here
that attempts to model the other steps towards the EMU separately were
fruitless, since the periods in between them are too short to provide us with
su±cient data.
<<< Insert table (9) about here >>>
Indeed the results in table (9) show that for most countries the Maastricht
e®ect brought an improvement in their budgetary status. Besides, this e®ect
was strongest for the countries that needed most improvement: Italy, Bel-
11This test, of which the results are not reported in the table, would be formulated as:
H0 : ¯i = 0 vs. H1 : ¯i > 0.
12Although the Maastricht treaty was in fact signed in 1992 and went into force on 1
November 1993, its e®ects on the macro economies are likely to become present during
the ¯rst year following its rati¯cation. Besides, as of this year the convergence criteria
applied.
25gium, Greece and Portugal are the countries with the highest average de¯cit
over the sample, and are the only countries with a 95% con¯dence interval
that is entirely smaller than 0. Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands, with
average de¯cits between 2:5 and 4:5%, follow in terms of magnitude of the
Maastricht e®ect and its signi¯cance, with a density mass that is strongly
located below zero by more than 94%. On the other hand, Finland and
Luxembourg show only minor, inconclusive responses following the Maas-
tricht e®ect, but did not face the necessity to improve their budgetary status
either. It is interesting to note that France and Germany show very little
response to the Maastricht Treaty, although both had de¯cits larger than 3%
in 1993. This absence of a clear quantitative e®ect is re°ecting particularly
the loosening of the budgetary policies of both countries in the early 2000s.
6.2 Predicting De¯cits
In order to derive predictive posterior results, the country-speci¯c densities
presented in table (16) can be used in the way described in expression (11).
In this section, predictive posterior results will be presented for France, for
which the model performed best in terms of the error term precision. The
hypothetical data X¤ on which the predictions will be based, are forecasts
for the economic explanatory variables in the model over the years 2007-
2009, obtained from the European Commission (EC, 2007). Besides, for the
political variables, hypothetical data are created based on the situation in
the country by the beginning of 2008, that allow to run scenario analysis.13
Figure (7) presents a graphical representation of the posterior results.
Starting from the observed de¯cit of 2:53%, the blue line is a plot of the pos-
terior mean results for the budget de¯cit, that slightly increases in election
year 2007 to a value of Def¤
F;2007 = 2:83 and next gradually diminishes over
the years 2008 and 2009 to 2:51 and 1:97, respectively. The dashed lines are
the 95% con¯dence intervals of the predictive posterior distributions, reveal-
ing that there is a considerable probability that the de¯cit will exceed the 3%
threshold, one of the critical pillars of the Stability and Growth Pact. The
variability of the posterior estimates is driven by two types of precision: the
precision related to the parameter estimates ¯i and the error term precision h.
<<< Insert ¯g. (7) about here >>>
The red lines present a forecast for a di®erent political scenario, assum-
13For the ideology index, a value of 2 represents the center-right orientation of the
government. The election dummy acquires a value of one only in 2007 and ¯nally the
Maastricht dummy equals one over all three years.
26ing that the elections in 2007 would have been won by the socialist party.
According to the posterior results of our model, the hypothesis that the pa-
rameter on the ideology index equals zero for France cannot be rejected, but
nevertheless the vast majority of the probability mass of its posterior density
function is located in the domain larger than zero. That implies that leftist
governments, with a higher index value, tend to have higher de¯cits. This
notion becomes directly apparent in ¯gure (7), where the lines start in the
same observed value in 2006 and then diverge. In 2007, the di®erence is
only 0:12 percentage points, but now the de¯cit develops di®erently to sub-
sequent values of 2:86 and 2:52. The divergence between the two scenarios
comes from both the e®ect of ideology and, after 2007, from the persistence
of the de¯cit, that in France is rather high around 0:86.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented a Random Coe±cient Model to evaluate a set of eco-
nomic and political determinants of budget de¯cits. This approach is consid-
erably di®erent from the standards in contemporary literature on this topic,
to the extent that it allows for heterogeneity of all the parameters in the
model. Although the vast majority of the European countries under consid-
eration experienced deterioration of their budgetary situation following the
oil crises in the 1970s, the level and persistence of these de¯cits varied heav-
ily over the countries, even when they faced similar economic and political
circumstances. This notion suggests that the roles of the various explanatory
variables in a typical (political) macroeconomic model di®er over the coun-
tries and consequently their coe±cients should be allowed to vary. Indeed,
results in this paper reveal a notable degree of heterogeneity between the
countries, and call for the use of estimation methodologies that take this into
account by providing additional °exibility.
At the same time, there exist similarities between the countries, and in
particular the integration of the EU-15 after the rati¯cation of the Maastricht
Treaty stimulated convergence between the participating members. In our
model this is speci¯cally revealed by the persistence of de¯cits and the role
of economic growth as a driving factor, that are rather homogeneous over
the entire sample period. On the other hand, the impact of unemployment
varies, re°ecting di®erences in employed policies and structural di®erences
in the level. Regarding the e®ect of political determinants, the empirical
results reveal a greater degree of heterogeneity in their size, but similarities
in terms of the explanatory power that the variables possess. More par-
ticular, the impact of ideology on the de¯cit is not evident. Its direction
varies over the countries, but in any case the results show that the index on
27ideology is rather uninformative, due to a lack of precision of the posterior
estimates. On the other hand, the opportunistic model strongly applies to
our model, convincingly revealing an increase in the de¯cit during election
years. Finally, countries acted di®erently on the requirements posed by the
Maastricht Treaty, with e®orts clearly related to the necessity to improve the
budgetary situation.
The number of political variables in our model could be extended in fu-
ture research, and their particular speci¯cation adjusted in order to enhance
their informativeness and increase the explanatory power of the model. Sug-
gestions for such adaptations can be found in other contemporaneous works
on budget de¯cits (c.f. Mulas-Granados, 2007). As a contribution, this pa-
per provided an estimation methodology that is novel in the ¯eld, and which
yields results that convincingly reveal the needs to allow for heterogeneity
even in a set of similar countries like the EU. Besides, the use of Bayesian
Random Coe±cient Methods is justi¯ed, being particularly gentle tools to
carry out such analysis and providing a richness of estimation results that
allow for considerably more detailed inference.
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30Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Average Budget Balance per country per time period
Year 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2006 1970-1993 1994-2006
Belgium -5,42 -10,12 -3,87 -0,25 -7,61 -1,07
Denmark 1,43 -1,91 -1,41 2,08 -0,72 0,91
Germany -2,01 -2,01 -2,30 -3,19 -2,15 -2,55
Greece -1,35 -10,36 -8,24 -5,39 -6,81 -5,69
Spain -0,58 -4,45 -4,10 0,32 -2,98 -1,49
France -0,29 -2,38 -3,69 -2,99 -1,89 -3,02
Ireland -7,92 -8,59 -0,15 1,01 -7,31 1,25
Italy -7,45 -11,22 -6,33 -3,59 -9,48 -3,66
Luxembourg 2,33 3,15 2,44 1,21 2,47 2,27
Netherlands -1,49 -4,96 -1,91 -1,14 -3,23 -1,07
Austria -0,87 -3,20 -3,12 -1,00 -2,28 -1,92
Portugal -2,90 -6,46 -4,85 -3,89 -5,01 -3,75
Finland 4,93 3,98 -2,22 3,41 2,82 1,65
Sweden 1,69 -0,79 -3,54 0,77 -0,85 -0,12
UK -3,10 -2,17 -3,09 -2,17 -3,20 -1,64
EU-15 1,53 4,10 3,09 0,99 3,22 1,33
31Table 2: Political Ideology: Fraction of time spent in each category
per country
Country Category
1 2 3 4 5
Belgium 21.6 2.7 75.7 0 0
Denmark 45.9 2.7 0 13.5 37.8
Germany 43.2 0 5.4 51.4 0
Greece 32.4 18.9 0 13.5 35.1
Spain 35.1 18.9 5.4 16.2 24.3
France 37.8 16.2 10.8 2.7 32.4
Ireland 54.1 35.1 10.8 0 0
Italy 16.2 62.2 8.1 13.5 0
Luxembourg 21.6 21.6 56.8 0 0
Netherlands 37.8 16.2 35.1 10.8 0
Austria 0 18.9 37.8 13.5 29.7
Portugal 32.4 16.2 16.2 21.6 13.5
Finland 0 10.8 75.7 13.5 0
Sweden 18.9 2.7 2.7 27 48.6
UK 51.4 2.7 2.7 21.6 21.6
EU-15 29.9 16.4 22.9 14.6 16.2
32Table 3: Number of elections per decade
Country Period
1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2006 Total
Belgium 4 3 3 1 11
Denmark 5 5 2 2 14
Germany 3 3 2 2 10
Greece 2 4 3 1 10
Spain 2 3 3 1 9
France 2 3 2 1 8
Ireland 2 4 2 1 9
Italy 3 2 3 2 10
Luxembourg 2 2 2 1 7
Netherlands 3 4 2 2 11
Austria 3 3 3 1 10
Portugal 5 3 3 2 13
Finland 3 2 3 1 9
Sweden 3 3 3 2 11
UK 2 2 2 2 8
EU-15 2.9 3.1 2.5 1.5 10
33Table 4: Posterior estimates for meta distribution ¹¯
Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% con¯-
dence interval for ¹¯, which is the mean impact of
the explanatory variables over all countries, with
¹¯ » N(¹¯;§¯):
Statistic
Variable Mean s.d. 95% C.I. ¾2
®i
DEFi;t 0.835 0.038 [ 0.757 , 0.911 ] 0.006
¢UBi;t 0.546 0.139 [ 0.270 , 0.825 ] 0.091
¢yi;t -0.110 0.043 [-0.196 , -0.025] 0.007
DRBi;t 0.012 0.052 [-0.096 , 0.110 ] 0.010
Ideoi;t -0.023 0.093 [-0.220 , 0.151 ] 0.038
Eleci;t 0.627 0.179 [ 0.278 , 0.973 ] 0.088
±M -0.420 0.233 [-0.894 , 0.016 ] 0.202
c 0.461 0.384 [-0.262 , 1.270 ] 0.762
34Table 5: Posterior estimates for error precision parameters h
Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% con-
¯dence interval for hi, which is the heteroscedastic
error precision de¯ned as hi = ¾
¡2







Country Mean s.d. 95% C.I.
Belgium 0.435 0.110 [0.249 , 0.675]
Denmark 0.446 0.111 [0.254 , 0.688]
Germany 0.669 0.176 [0.373 , 1.059]
Greece 0.289 0.075 [0.162 , 0.452]
Spain 1.002 0.256 [0.564 , 1.565]
France 1.838 0.477 [1.027 , 2.882]
Ireland 0.302 0.075 [0.173 , 0.465]
Italy 0.664 0.179 [0.367 , 1.068]
Luxembourg 0.273 0.068 [0.160 , 0.422]
Netherlands 0.734 0.185 [0.417 , 1.146]
Austria 1.119 0.284 [0.636 , 1.745]
Portugal 0.432 0.109 [0.248 , 0.667]
Finland 0.370 0.095 [0.210 , 0.575]
Sweden 0.317 0.090 [0.170 , 0.519]
UK 0.513 0.130 [0.293 , 0.796]
35Table 6: Posterior estimates for country-speci¯c persistence pa-
rameters
Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% con¯-
dence interval for the elements of ¯i related to per-
sistence:





Country Mean s.d. 95% C.I.
Belgium 0.849 0.061 [0.727 , 0.968]
Denmark 0.879 0.059 [0.766 , 0.999]
Germany 0.763 0.092 [0.550 , 0.915]
Greece 0.864 0.054 [0.757 , 0.968]
Spain 0.878 0.062 [0.757 , 1.003]
France 0.858 0.062 [0.731 , 0.980]
Ireland 0.844 0.056 [0.731 , 0.955]
Italy 0.828 0.065 [0.697 , 0.950]
Luxembourg 0.856 0.067 [0.719 , 0.984]
Netherlands 0.828 0.067 [0.693 , 0.961]
Austria 0.804 0.065 [0.673 , 0.929]
Portugal 0.812 0.064 [0.679 , 0.932]
Finland 0.874 0.057 [0.761 , 0.988]
Sweden 0.790 0.065 [0.658 , 0.915]
UK 0.792 0.067 [0.650 , 0.913]
36Table 7: Posterior estimates for country-speci¯c parameters on
ideology
Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% con¯-
dence interval for the elements of ¯i related to gov-
ernment ideology.





Country Mean s.d. 95% C.I.
Belgium -0.012 0.183 [-0.382 , 0.353]
Denmark 0.054 0.116 [-0.170 , 0.292]
Germany 0.032 0.116 [-0.201 , 0.261]
Greece 0.047 0.139 [-0.220 , 0.327]
Spain 0.090 0.103 [-0.111 , 0.295]
France 0.123 0.074 [-0.023 , 0.270]
Ireland -0.030 0.175 [-0.393 , 0.310]
Italy -0.147 0.216 [-0.609 , 0.237]
Luxembourg 0.006 0.196 [-0.385 , 0.410]
Netherlands -0.037 0.131 [-0.318 , 0.205]
Austria 0.000 0.138 [-0.275 , 0.280]
Portugal -0.013 0.134 [-0.288 , 0.245]
Finland -0.052 0.238 [-0.547 , 0.425]
Sweden -0.327 0.199 [-0.748 , 0.024]
UK -0.074 0.113 [-0.307 , 0.136]
37Table 8: Posterior estimates for country-speci¯c parameters on
e®ect of elections
Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% con¯-
dence interval for the elements of ¯i related to gov-
ernment ideology.




Country Mean s.d. 95% C.I.
Belgium 0.494 0.296 [-0.146 , 1.026]
Denmark 0.700 0.274 [ 0.184 , 1.268]
Germany 0.577 0.259 [ 0.049 , 1.074]
Greece 0.701 0.303 [ 0.141 , 1.385]
Spain 0.526 0.254 [ 0.009 , 1.022]
France 0.669 0.219 [ 0.243 , 1.108]
Ireland 0.540 0.273 [-0.051 , 1.038]
Italy 0.467 0.330 [-0.197 , 1.109]
Luxembourg 0.615 0.319 [-0.047 , 1.243]
Netherlands 0.558 0.234 [ 0.083 , 1.002]
Austria 0.750 0.234 [ 0.311 , 1.239]
Portugal 0.569 0.254 [ 0.031 , 1.051]
Finland 0.866 0.357 [ 0.224 , 1.660]
Sweden 0.729 0.384 [-0.030 , 1.495]
UK 0.613 0.254 [ 0.095 , 1.107]
38Table 9: Posterior estimates for country-speci¯c parameters on
Maastricht e®ect
Posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% con¯-
dence interval for the elements of ¯i related to gov-
ernment ideology.




Country Mean s.d. 95% C.I.
Belgium -0.741 0.404 [-1.626 , -0.034]
Denmark -0.148 0.317 [-0.749 , 0.505]
Germany -0.196 0.298 [-0.760 , 0.417]
Greece -0.678 0.392 [-1.539 , 0.000]
Spain -0.375 0.283 [-0.927 , 0.188]
France -0.079 0.255 [-0.570 , 0.429]
Ireland -0.595 0.361 [-1.385 , 0.048]
Italy -0.987 0.461 [-1.951 , -0.176]
Luxembourg -0.121 0.372 [-0.820 , 0.682]
Netherlands -0.479 0.272 [-1.025 , 0.047]
Austria -0.354 0.314 [-0.987 , 0.267]
Portugal -0.613 0.318 [-1.296 , -0.037]
Finland 0.003 0.427 [-0.765 , 0.908]
Sweden -0.452 0.436 [-1.331 , 0.426]
UK -0.463 0.303 [-1.067 , 0.146]
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Predicted Budget De¯cits in France, 2007-2009
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